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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SIXTH AMENDMENT—BRAVING 
CONFRONTATION: ARKANSAS’S PROGRESSIVE POSITION REGARDING 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS’ CONFRONTATION RIGHTS AT SENTENCING.     
I. INTRODUCTION
Recognizing the importance of a criminal defendant’s confrontation 
rights and the impact on everyone if those rights are denied, Justice Scalia 
wrote: “But he surely has not received [his just deserts] pursuant to the pro-
cedures that our Constitution requires. And what has been taken away from 
him has been taken away from us all.”1
To ensure that individuals would be guarded against this type of gov-
ernment action, the Framers2 added a number of rights to the Constitution to 
protect the life and liberty of Americans.3 As a shining example, the Sixth 
Amendment grants specific rights to defendants during criminal proceed-
ings:4
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].5   
A majority of courts, however, have drawn a distinction between the 
guilt phase and the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings and have not 
applied the right to confrontation during the latter phase.6 The Supreme 
Court of the United States7 has examined how courts apply the Confronta-
 1. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 2. The use of “Framers” throughout this note refers to the first Congress that drafted 
the Bill of Rights. See generally Founding Documents, BILL OF RIGHTS INSTITUTE,
http://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) 
(containing information about the first Congress and its role in the development of the Con-
stitution). 
 3. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 5. Id.   
 6. See Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hammer, 3 
F.3d 266, 272 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1510 (6th Cir. 1992).  
 7. For the remainder of the note, Supreme Court of the United States will be referred to 
as either “Supreme Court” or “Court.” 
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tion Clause in the guilt phase of a trial and has recently expanded the scope 
of its application. The Court’s decisions in subsequent cases have simulta-
neously confirmed the importance of a defendant’s right to confront wit-
nesses yet remained silent on the application of that right at sentencing.8
In 2004, the Court overruled the standard it had followed for over two 
decades with its decision in Crawford v. Washington.9 In Crawford, the 
Court rejected the reliability standard10 for out-of-court testimonial state-
ments that it had previously applied.11 Instead, the Court held that out-of-
court statements that were testimonial in nature were not admissible unless 
the declarant testified at trial or, if unavailable, the defendant had been given 
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.12 Since Crawford, the 
Court has decided several cases dealing with the Confrontation Clause, fur-
ther expanding criminal defendants’ right to confront witnesses in various 
forms.13 The Court, however, has never addressed a criminal defendant’s 
right of confrontation at the sentencing phase.14 States, therefore, have no 
explicit guidance for confrontation rights at sentencing.   
Recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued a monumental decision 
regarding confrontation rights of criminal defendants. In Vankirk v. State,15
the court held that criminal defendants have a right of confrontation at sen-
tencing under the United States and Arkansas Constitutions.16 With this de-
cision, Arkansas has joined a small group of state and federal courts that 
recognize the importance of this Sixth Amendment right at the sentencing 
phase. Arkansas, however, stands alone with its explicit holding that the 
Confrontation Clause must apply at sentencing in both capital and non-
capital cases, without limiting that right to sentencings where the jury is 
finding facts that could increase the defendant’s sentence beyond the statu-
tory maximum.17
 8. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004).  
 9. 541 U.S. 36, 54–65 (2004) (overturning the reliability standard the courts had been 
following since Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). 
 10. The reliability standard meant that the court allowed an unavailable witness’s state-
ment to be admitted into evidence as long as the statement had an “adequate ‘indicia of relia-
bility.’” Id. at 40 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 11. Id.
 12. See id. at 68. 
 13. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 
S.Ct. 1143 (2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 14. Many courts, however, cite to the Court’s decision in Williams v. New York for this 
proposition. For a further discussion of Williams see infra Part II.A.1. 
 15. 2011 Ark. 428, 385 S.W.3d 144. 
 16. Id. at 10, 385 S.W.3d 151. 
 17. See id. at 9, 385 S.W.3d at 150. 
2013] BRAVING CONFRONTATION 693
This note argues that all courts should follow Arkansas’s lead and 
should apply the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause at both the guilt 
and sentencing phases of trial. First, this note covers the history of the Con-
frontation Clause’s application at sentencing in the Supreme Court, in state 
courts, and in Arkansas prior to Vankirk.18 Next, this note examines the 
Vankirk decision and discusses the future of sentencing in Arkansas after 
Vankirk in light of recent Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence.19 Finally, this note proposes that other states should follow Arkan-
sas’s lead on this issue and that the Supreme Court should rule that the Con-
frontation Clause must apply at the sentencing phase of trial.20 In support of 
this proposal, this note makes five distinct arguments.  
The first argument is that the plain meaning of the Sixth Amendment 
supports the Confrontation Clause’s application at both the guilt and sen-
tencing phases of trial. The second argument is that the Framers did not con-
template a bifurcated trial process; thus, they did not specifically state that 
confrontation rights apply at the sentencing phase. The third argument is 
that allowing evidence to be presented at sentencing that has not been tested 
through cross-examination is the principal evil that the Framers intended to 
guard against with the Confrontation Clause. The fourth argument is that 
Williams v. New York,21 which many courts use to deny confrontation rights 
at sentencing, is not Supreme Court precedent for this purpose. The fifth, 
and last, argument is one of fairness—that confrontation rights at both phas-
es of trial are necessary to maintain the integrity of the justice system. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To understand how the Vankirk decision departed from traditional Con-
frontation Clause decisions, the history of its application at sentencing is 
essential. This section first examines that history in Supreme Court cases.22
Next, this section focuses on how other states have applied the Confronta-
tion Clause at sentencing.23 Finally, this section discusses how Arkansas 
courts have applied the Confrontation Clause at the sentencing phase prior 
to Vankirk.24
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See infra Part III.B. 
 21. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 22. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 23. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 24. See infra Part II.B.  
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A. History of the Confrontation Clause at Sentencing
1. Supreme Court of the United States 
Although the Supreme Court has analyzed the Confrontation Clause in 
several cases,25 the Court has not addressed the right of confrontation at sen-
tencing.26 Many courts, however, erroneously rely on Williams v. New 
York27 as Supreme Court precedent on this issue.28 In Williams, the defend-
ant was convicted of first-degree murder, and the jury recommended life in 
prison.29 After considering other evidence, however, the trial judge sen-
tenced him to death.30 At sentencing, the judge stated that the presentence 
report contained information of the defendant’s participation in other burgla-
ries and of his “‘morbid sexuality,’” which the judge believed merited the 
harsher sentence.31
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court and claimed that impos-
ing a harsher sentence than was recommended by the jury, based on infor-
mation not presented to the jury, was a violation of his due process right 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.32 The Court, however, ruled that sentenc-
ing judges need access to as much information as possible so that the sen-
tence imposed can be tailored to the defendant.33 The Court conceded “that 
most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the in-
telligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were 
 25. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 
S.Ct. 1143 (2011) Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 26. See United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp.2d 714, 725 (2005) (“The Supreme Court, 
however, has never decided whether sentencings are ‘criminal prosecutions’ for Sixth 
Amendment purposes.”). See also Michael S. Pardo, Confrontation Clause Implications of 
Constitutional Sentencing Options, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 230 (2006) (“Although the Supreme 
Court has not answered definitively whether a confrontation right ever applies at sentencing, 
several federal circuits have concluded that it does not.”). 
 27. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that Williams was still good law and that the right of confrontation does not extend to judge 
sentencings in noncapital cases); State v. Phillips, 381 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1989) (relying on 
Williams to say that using hearsay evidence at sentencing does not violate the Constitution); 
but see United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp.2d 1115, 1131–35 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (finding that 
Williams was no longer binding authority after subsequent Supreme Court decisions). 
 29. Williams, 337 U.S. 241. 
 30. Id.
 31. Id. at 244. 
 32. Id. at 245.   
 33. Id. at 247. The Court went further and explained that to better individualize punish-
ment for each defendant the judge should be able to assess all necessary information to more 
accurately form that judgment and not be stymied by strict rules. Therefore, the Court wanted 
the judge to have access to any and all information that he found essential to better suit the 
punishment to the defendant. See id.
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restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-
examination.”34 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the trial was con-
ducted fairly, including the judge’s use of out-of-court information in sen-
tencing.35
Justice Rutledge and Justice Murphy disagreed with the majority.36 In 
his dissent, Justice Murphy stated that a sentencing judge should increase 
sentencing “only with the most scrupulous regard for the rights of the de-
fendant.”37 Furthermore, he concluded that in Williams, the judge sentenced 
the defendant to death based on information that was inadmissible at trial, 
was comprised mostly of hearsay, was damaging, and was not subject to the 
defendant’s scrutiny.38  Therefore, Justice Murphy argued that the defend-
ant’s due process right was violated at sentencing.39 He stated that “[d]ue 
process of law includes at least the idea that a person accused of crime shall 
be accorded a fair hearing through all the stages of the proceedings against 
him.”40  The Court majority, however, did not agree. 
2. States Other Than Arkansas 
Without explicit guidance from the Supreme Court, the states are split 
on confrontation rights at sentencing. The majority of state supreme courts41
and federal courts of appeal42 have held that the Confrontation Clause does 
not apply at sentencing. A few states, however, have extended the right to 
jury sentencing when the court asked the jury to find facts during the sen-
tencing phase that could increase the possible punishment.43 In State v. Ro-
 34. Williams, 337 U.S. at 250. The Court also stated that depriving judges of this infor-
mation would “undermine modern penological procedural policies” that had been put into 
place. Id.
 35. Id. at 252. 
 36. Id.
 37. Id. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id.
 39. Id.
 40. Williams, 337 U.S. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 41. See, e.g., State v. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d 190, 242 (Neb. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1887 (2010); State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 941-42 (Ariz. 2006). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Robinson, 482 F.3d 244, 246 
(3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Beydoun, 469 F.3d 102, 108 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Bustamante, 454 F.3d 1200, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 
1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown, 430 F.3d 
942, 943–44 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Martinez, 413 
F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 43. See Peters v. State, 984 So.2d 1227, 1224 (Fla. 2008) (holding that probation revoca-
tion proceedings are not equated to criminal prosecutions; therefore, the Confrontation Clause 
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driguez,44 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the right of confrontation 
should apply at jury sentencing where the jury finds facts that lead to a sen-
tence enhancement.45 In its analysis, the court discussed prior Supreme 
Court decisions and held that allowing testimonial statements by witnesses 
who had not been cross-examined was exactly what the Confrontation 
Clause was designed to prevent.46 The court stated that “[b]ecause cross-
examination is a core component of a defendant’s right to a jury trial, we 
hold that the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
applies in jury sentencing trials.”47
In State v. Hurt,48 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina also recog-
nized a defendant’s confrontation right at sentencing.49 In that case, the court 
did not rely upon the Williams decision to decline extending confrontation 
rights at sentencing but instead relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Specht v. Patterson50 to support extending those rights.51 During its analysis, 
the court in Hurt also reviewed other Supreme Court cases where juries 
were charged with fact-finding at sentencing to help decide a punishment.52
The court held that at jury sentencing “the defendant endures another ‘mini-
trial,’ which has often been bifurcated or even trifurcated from the trial on 
the substantive offense, to discover whether he will lose more liberty than 
otherwise allowable under the applicable statute.”53 Therefore, the Hurt 
court held that a defendant’s confrontation right applied at both capital and 
non-capital jury sentencings where a jury determines any facts that could 
increase the defendant’s sentence.54
does not apply); State v. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d 672 (Minn. 2008); State v. Hurt,702 S.E.2d 
82, 92–93 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).  
 44. 754 N.W.2d 672 (2008). 
 45. Id. at 678–80.     
 46. Id. The court also noted that its conclusion was supported by prior cases decided by 
the court regarding due process and confrontation rights. Id. at 680. 
 47. Id. at 680. 
 48. 702 S.E.2d 82, 88 (2010). 
 49. See id. at 94–95. 
 50. 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (extending the confrontation rights at the enhancement 
stage of sentencing for a sex offender when a state statute allowed the judge to make a find-
ing of whether the defendant constituted a threat of bodily harm or was an habitual offender 
or mentally ill). 
 51. Hurt, 702 S.E.2d at 91. 
 52. Id. at 89 (discussing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and its progeny). 
 53. Id. at 95.  
 54. Id. at 87. The court conceded that though death or capital cases have been consid-
ered different, it believed that “the importance of safeguarding the accuracy and propriety of 
jury fact-finding in sentencing” applied to capital and non-capital cases.  Id. at 94. 
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B. History of the Confrontation Clause in Arkansas 
Arkansas courts have not been exempt from cases involving Confronta-
tion Clause implications, though none had reached the Arkansas Supreme 
Court prior to Vankirk v. State. As the Vankirk court noted, the issue of the 
Confrontation Clause’s application at the sentencing phase of trial was an 
issue of first impression with the court.55 The Arkansas Court of Appeals, 
however, has had the opportunity to examine this issue twice in less than 
two years, and, in both cases, it held that the right of confrontation does not 
apply at sentencing.56 In Wallace v. State,57 the circuit court allowed a rec-
ords-intake supervisor to testify about the defendant’s prison record at sen-
tencing.58 The defendant appealed, and the appellate court held that, without 
binding authority on the issue, it would not apply the Confrontation Clause 
at sentencing.59 Therefore, the court was reluctant to make that ruling with-
out first having specific guidance from the Supreme Court.60
Recently, in Doles v. State,61 the court of appeals had another oppor-
tunity to rule on whether the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing. In 
Doles, the defendant objected to the court’s admission of a 911 call in which 
the caller alleged that the defendant was pointing a gun at her.62 The court of 
appeals did not analyze the objection in light of the Confrontation Clause’s 
application at sentencing but instead focused on the nature of the 911 re-
cording.63 The court held that the circuit court’s ruling on the nature of the 
911 recording was correct and held that the 911 call was not testimonial in 
nature but was instead an attempt to get assistance from the police in an 
emergency situation.64  Thus, by finding that the 911 call was not testimonial 
in nature, the court avoided the Confrontation Clause issue. Recently, how-
ever, the Arkansas Supreme Court directly confronted the issue of a defend-
ant’s right to confront witnesses at sentencing and found that the Confronta-
tion Clause must apply.65
 55. Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, at 2, 385 S.W.3d 144, 147. 
 56. See Doles v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 476, 385 S.W.3d 315; Wallace v. State, 2010
Ark. App. 706, 378 S.W.3d 269.  
 57. Wallace, 2010 Ark. App. 706, 378 S.W.3d 269. 
 58. Id. at 3, 378 S.W.3d at 273. 
 59. Id., 378 S.W.3d at 273. 
 60. Id. at 6, 378 S.W.3d 269, 273. “The United States Supreme Court has never applied 
the Confrontation Clause to sentencing, and the Melendez-Diaz decision does not extend that 
application. . . . Accordingly, there is no precedent, including the holding in Melendez-Diaz,
upon which to expand the holding in Crawford to sentencing.” Id.
 61. 2011 Ark. App. 476, 385 S.W.3d 315.  
 62. Id. at 2, 385 S.W.3d at 316–17. 
 63. Id. at 3, 385 S.W.3d at 318. 
 64. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 318. 
 65. Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, at 10, 385 S.W.3d 144, 151. 
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III. ARGUMENT
The Vankirk court parted with previous Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence when it held that a criminal defendant has a right to confrontation at 
the sentencing phase and should be followed by other courts.66 This section 
begins with a discussion of the Vankirk decision, focusing first on its back-
ground and analysis.67 Next, it will briefly evaluate the impact Vankirk could 
have on sentencing in Arkansas.68 Finally, it will conclude with an examina-
tion of five arguments that support the Vankirk decision, as well as with a 
proposal that state and federal courts adopt the Vankirk holding.69
A. Vankirk: An Improvement on Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence 
1. Background of Vankirk and the Court’s Analysis 
In January 2010, Ira Gene Vankirk was charged with three counts of 
rape.70 His twelve year old niece, C.V., was his accuser.71 Vankirk pled 
guilty to the charges72 and sought a jury sentencing.73 At sentencing, the 
state introduced a videotaped interview between C.V. and an Arkansas State 
Police Crimes Against Children investigator in which C.V. accused Vankirk 
of sexual abuse that spanned several years.74 In the video, C.V. stated that 
Vankirk’s sexual abuse started when she was five or six years old.75
Vankirk objected to the prosecution’s showing of the videotape to the 
jury.76 The circuit court judge overruled the objection and stated that the 
rules of evidence did not apply at sentencing and that the video was a victim 
impact statement.77 Vankirk also made a statement at sentencing and re-
 66. Id.
 67. See infra Part III.A.1.  
 68. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 69. See infra Part III.B.1–5. 
 70. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. 428, at 1, 385 S.W.3d at 146. Vankirk was charged under ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 71. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. 428, at 1–2, 385 S.W.3d at 146. 
 72. Id. at 2, 385 S.W.3d at 146. 
 73. Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101(6) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 74. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 2, 385 S.W.3d at 186. 
 75. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 186. 
 76. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 186. 
 77. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 186. The trial court mistakenly ruled that the rules of evidence did 
not apply at sentencing. The Arkansas Supreme Court had previously held that the rules did 
apply during the sentencing phase. See Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 413, 887 S.W.2d 275, 277 
(1994). A victim impact statement is “[a] statement read into the record during sentencing to 
inform the judge or jury of the financial, physical, and psychological impact of the crime on 
the victim and the victim’s family.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1703 (9th ed. 2009). 
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counted years of abuse that his uncle inflicted on him.78 In addition, he ad-
mitted to molesting not only C.V. but another niece and nephew as well.79
After considering the evidence presented, the jury returned a verdict of three 
consecutive life sentences.80 Vankirk appealed the sentence and alleged that 
the circuit court denied him his constitutional rights, under both the United 
States and Arkansas Constitutions, to confront the witnesses against him by 
allowing the jury to view the videotaped interview.81
On appeal, the state had three main arguments: (1) Vankirk did not pre-
serve his right to confrontation under the Arkansas Constitution; (2) Vankirk 
waived his right to confront witnesses when he pled guilty to the charges; 
and (3) Vankirk’s argument failed on the merits because the Supreme Court 
of the United States held, in Williams v. New York that the Confrontation 
Clause did not apply at sentencing.82 Vankirk argued that the Confrontation 
Clause should be extended to sentencing and that nothing in the Sixth 
Amendment limits that right to only the guilt phase of trial.83
The court found the state’s first argument to be meritless84 by relying 
on Pointer v. Texas,85 which was the first case to use the Fourteenth 
Amendment to incorporate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 
and to make it applicable to the states.86 The court also noted that it had pre-
viously held that the Confrontation Clauses in both the United States and the 
Arkansas Constitutions were interpreted “to provide identical rights.”87 In 
addition, the court rejected the state’s second argument, finding that Vankirk 
 78. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 2, 385 S.W.3d at 146.
 79. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 146 
 80. Id. at 1, 385 S.W.3d at 146. 
 81. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 146. 
 82. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 3, 7, 385 S.W.3d at 147, 149.
 83. Id. at 3, 385 S.W.3d at 147. 
 84. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 147. 
 85. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 86. Id. at 406. 
 87. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 3–4, 385 S.W.3d at 147, (citing Hale v. State, 343 Ark. 62, 83, 
31 S.W.3d 850, 863 (2000)). The Arkansas Constitution states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the crime shall have been 
committed; provided, that the venue may be changed to any other county of the 
judicial district in which the indictment is found, upon the application of the ac-
cused, in such manner as now is, or may be prescribed by law; and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy 
thereof; and to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to be heard by himself and his 
counsel.  
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10. 
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did not waive his right to confront the witnesses against him solely because 
he pled guilty to the charges.88   
The court then moved on to the heart of the case: the application of the 
Confrontation Clause at sentencing.89 The court recognized that the Supreme 
Court of the United States’s decision in Crawford v. Washington90 was the 
correct starting place for its Confrontation Clause analysis.91 Using Craw-
ford, the court determined that the video was testimonial because “[t]he 
statements of the victim in the video were made to a state investigator for 
the purpose of proving events relevant to a criminal investigation. As such, 
the statements were testimonial in nature, and the Confrontation Clause was 
thereby implicated.”92 The court next addressed whether the Confrontation 
Clause applies during the sentencing phase of trial.93
The court began by looking at how sentencing works in Arkansas.94
Specifically, the court relied on the analysis in Hill v. State,95 which inter-
preted the changes that Arkansas made to jury trials in 199396 when it codi-
fied a statute that provides for separate guilt and sentencing phases, also 
known as bifurcated proceedings.97 The court agreed with the Hill court’s 
statement that “sentencing is now, in essence, a trial in and of itself, in 
which new evidence may be submitted.”98 Because of the sentencing phase 
in a bifurcated trial, the court concluded that “constitutional standards can-
not be ignored.”99
 88. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 4, 385 S.W.3d at 147. The court found the state’s reliance on 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.4 (e) (2012) to be erroneous because that rule did not contemplate a 
bifurcated trial. 
 89. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 147 
 90. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). If the tape was not found to be testimonial, there would be no 
Confrontation Clause issue. 
 91. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 5, 385 S.W.3d at 148. 
 92. Id. at 6, 385 S.W.3d at 148. In interpreting the Crawford testimonial requirement, 
the court also relied on its decision in Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 282 S.W.3d 778 (2008).
Id. at 5, 385 S.W.3d at 148. In Seely, the court looked at the statements as made to officials or 
non-officials, the circumstances surrounding the statements, and the primary purpose behind 
the statements to determine if the statements were testimonial. Seely, 373 Ark. at 152, 282
S.W.3d at 787. 
 93. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 6, 385 S.W.3d at 148.  
 94. Id. at 6, 385 S.W.3d at 148–49. 
 95. 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994). 
 96. Id. at 412, 887 S.W.2d at 277. 
 97. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (2006 & Supp. 2011). “After a plea of guilty, the 
defendant, with the agreement of the prosecution and the consent of the court, may be sen-
tenced by a jury impaneled for purposes of sentencing only.” Id. at (6). 
 98. Hill, 318 Ark. at 413, 887 S.W.2d at 277. “The introduction of evidence during this 
stage must be governed by our rules of admissibility and exclusion; otherwise these proceed-
ings would not pass constitutional muster, which is all the more reason to permit appeal.” Id.
at 413, 887 S.W.2d at 278. 
 99. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 7, 385 S.W.3d at 149.   
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The court also rejected the state’s argument that Williams v. New 
York100 was Supreme Court precedent prohibiting the Confrontation 
Clause’s application at sentencing.101 The court held that Williams did not 
apply because it involved a Due Process challenge as opposed to a Confron-
tation Clause challenge.102 In addition, the court found the Williams argu-
ment unpersuasive because it was decided years before Pointer applied the 
Confrontation Clause to the states.103 Furthermore, Williams involved judge 
sentencing as opposed to jury sentencing.104 Thus, the court disposed of Wil-
liams by distinguishing it. Consequently, the court held that Williams was 
not controlling and instead relied on United States v. Mills,105 a death-
penalty case involving jury sentencing.106 Particularly, the court found the 
Mills conclusion persuasive, which stated that a sentencing body’s need to 
access more evidence does not merit admission of evidence that is unconsti-
tutional.107
The court also discussed other rights that criminal defendants have at 
sentencing in Arkansas,108 such as the rules of evidence109 and the rules of 
discovery.110 In addition, the court noted that other Sixth Amendment rights, 
such as the right to counsel111 and the right to a speedy sentencing, already 
apply at sentencing.112 Consequently, the court found that the defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause right at sentencing was consistent with rights the court 
has already recognized at sentencing in Arkansas.113 Therefore, the court 
stated that after recognizing “the nature of sentencing as a separate proceed-
ing”114 and after reviewing “the other rights afforded a defendant during the 
sentencing phase,” it was “convinced that the right of confrontation, guaran-
teed by both the Sixth Amendment and article 2, section 10, extends to Ap-
pellant’s sentencing proceeding before a jury.”115
 100. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 101. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 8, 385 S.W.3d at 149.   
 102. Id. at 8, 385 S.W.3d at 150.   
 103. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 150 
 104. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 150 
 105. 446 F. Supp.2d 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 106. Id. “We are cognizant of the fact that Mills is a death-penalty case but find the 
court’s analysis of the constitutional protections afforded during sentencing to be noteworthy 
nonetheless.” Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 8–9, 385 S.W.3d at 150.   
 107. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 9, 385 S.W.3d at 150 (quoting from United States v. Mills, 
446 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2006)). 
 108. Id. at 10. 
 109. Id. (citing Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994)). 
 110. Id. (citing Phillips v. State, 321 Ark. 160, 900 S.W.2d 526 (1995)). 
 111. Id. (citing Smith v. State, 329 Ark. 238, 947 S.W.2d 373 (1997)). 
 112. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 10, 385 S.W.3d at 151. 
 113. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 151. 
 114. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 151. 
 115. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 151. 
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After determining that the Confrontation Clause applied at sentencing, 
the court then proceeded to subject the violation to a harmless-error analysis 
and found that the video’s admission was not harmless error.116 The court 
reversed and remanded for resentencing.117
2. Impact of Supreme Court Cases on Arkansas Sentencing After 
Vankirk
Because Vankirk gave criminal defendants confrontation rights at sen-
tencing, Arkansas courts must now evaluate evidence at that phase in ac-
cordance with the Arkansas Rules of Evidence and current Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding the Confrontation Clause. As this note previously 
pointed out, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether the Confrontation 
Clause must apply at sentencing.118 The Court has, however, decided several 
cases involving the Confrontation Clause in relation to evidence admissible 
at trial.119 To determine if evidence presented passes “constitutional mus-
ter,”120 Arkansas courts will first need to conduct a Crawford testimonial 
examination of evidence presented at the sentencing phase to determine if 
the Confrontation Clause is triggered.121 If the evidence is testimonial, the 
courts will then need to consider if one of the exceptions applies before it 
can be admitted.122 For example, if the prosecution presents a statement 
made to the police as evidence, the courts must determine if the statement 
was made with a primary purpose of assisting in an ongoing emergency.123
 116. Id. at 11, 385 S.W.3d at 151. The court found that the jury watching the young vic-
tim recount incidents of abuse beginning at age five or six would be prejudicial, that the 
statements were uncorroborated, and that the state could have produced C.V. to testify and be 
cross-examined. Id.
 117. Id. at 12, 385 S.W.3d at 152. Vankirk has not yet been resentenced as of May 16, 
2013. 
 118. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004).  
 120. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 413, 887 S.W.2d 275, 2787 (1994). 
 121. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Testimonial evidence includes but is not limited to “prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations.” Id. The Confrontation Clause is not implicated unless the evidence is testi-
monial. 
 122. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (holding that the victim’s statements 
to police officers were not testimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause because 
the primary purpose of the statements was to aid police officers in an ongoing emergency); 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (holding that a victim’s statements during a 911 
call were not testimonial as they were to aid police in an ongoing emergency but a domestic 
battery victim’s statements to police in an affidavit were testimonial because there was no 
emergency in progress). 
 123. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813–14 (2006). 
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In its analysis, the court must conduct an objective evaluation of the circum-
stances, the statements, and the actions of the party to determine if the 
statement was made with that purpose.124 If after examination the court finds 
the statements were made with the primary purpose of assisting in an ongo-
ing emergency, then the statements are not testimonial.125  Conversely, if the 
statements are found to be testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause must 
apply.126
Additionally, the Confrontation Clause analysis at sentencing will not 
only be limited to statements—reports and records will also need to be test-
ed.127 If a court were considering admitting a report as evidence during the 
sentencing phase of trial, the actual author of the report must be present to 
testify about the contents.128 Although admitting evidence at jury 
sentencings will now have to pass a more stringent test, the Vankirk court 
correctly ruled that the Confrontation Clause should apply at sentencing. 
B. The Vankirk Decision is Supported by Five Arguments and Should be 
Adopted by Other State and Federal Courts 
This section focuses on five arguments that support why other state and 
federal courts should adopt the Vankirk decision holding that a criminal de-
fendant’s confrontation rights extend to the sentencing phase. The first ar-
gument focuses on the text of the Sixth Amendment itself.129 The second 
argument explains that the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not envision 
separate guilt and sentencing phases and, therefore, could not have intended 
the Confrontation Clause’s application at only the guilt phase.130 The third 
argument is that the Confrontation Clause must be applied at sentencing to 
guard against the principal evil it was intended to prevent—that is using 
evidence against the defendant that has not been subjected to adversarial 
tests.131 The fourth argument is that courts have erroneously relied on Wil-
liams v. New York to deny confrontation rights at sentencing.132 Finally, the 
 124. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011). The Court found that the subjec-
tive intent of the individual was not relevant. Id. 
 125. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 126. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009). Records can include—among other things—
reports, certificates, and affidavits. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538–39. 
 128. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713. Otherwise, the report’s author must be unavailable 
and must have been previously cross-examined by the defendant before the report may be 
admitted at sentencing. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)). 
 129. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 130. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 131. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 132. See infra Part III.B.4. 
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fifth argument focuses on fairness throughout trial by applying the Confron-
tation Clause at both the guilt and sentencing phases.133
1. Textualist Argument 
Interpretation of any constitutional provision has to begin with the text 
itself.134 The Sixth Amendment is no exception to this method of interpreta-
tion, and its text supports what the Vankirk court found—that sentencing 
should be considered part of a criminal prosecution.135 The text of the Sixth 
Amendment begins with the phrase“[i]n all criminal prosecutions.”136 Many 
have argued that once the defendant has been found guilty of a crime, the 
prosecution has ended.137 Justice Arnold noted, however, “If ‘plain meaning’ 
is the criterion, this is an easy case. Surely no one would contend that sen-
tencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a ‘criminal prosecution.’”138
Similarly, Professors Francis Heller and Penny White argued that the 
criminal prosecution actually starts with arraignment and ends with the de-
fendant either being sentenced or acquitted.139 If the defendant has been 
found guilty, it stands to reason that the punishment phase of the trial is a 
very important part of the criminal prosecution itself. Without punishing 
guilty defendants, the guilt phase is deemed meaningless.140 Consequently, 
the sentencing phase of trial must be considered part of the criminal prose-
cution.  
Another term in the text that supports a court’s application of the Con-
frontation Clause at sentencing is the Framers’ use of “accused” to describe 
 133. See infra Part III.B.5. 
 134. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 406 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). In Wise, the defendant was convicted of counterfeiting. Id. at 395 
(majority opinion). 
 135. Id. at 407 (Arnold, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
 136. U.S. CONST. amend VI (emphasis added). 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A sentencing 
hearing, however, is not a ‘criminal prosecution’ within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment 
because its sole purpose is to determine only the appropriate punishment for the offense, not 
the accused’s guilt.”). See also United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 400–01 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that the sentencing guidelines did not change sentencing into a separate criminal 
proceeding where the right to confront witnesses was applicable).  
 138. Wise, 976 F.2d at 407 (Arnold, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 139. See Francis H. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States: A Study in Constitutional Development 54 (1951); Penny J. White, “He Said,” “She 
Said,” and Issues of Life and Death: The Right to Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Pro-
ceedings, 19 REGENT U.L. REV. 387, 395–96 (2006) (including the Webster’s definition of 
prosecution). 
 140. See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sen-
tencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 2008 (2005). 
2013] BRAVING CONFRONTATION 705
the criminal defendant.141 It has been argued that once a defendant has been 
found guilty, he is no longer the “accused” but is instead the “convicted.”142
At least one other Sixth Amendment right, however, has consistently been 
available to the convicted at sentencing—the right to counsel.143 Strangely 
enough, the Right to Counsel Clause appears in the Sixth Amendment with 
the Confrontation Clause, and most courts, including the Supreme Court, 
have repeatedly found this right applicable at sentencing.144 The right to 
counsel, however, is only applicable to those that are “accused” as mandated 
by the Sixth Amendment.145 If the “accused” defendant has a right to coun-
sel at sentencing after he has been “convicted,” it logically follows that the 
convicted also has a right to confront witnesses. 
The Framers likely intended the “accused” to simply mean the criminal 
defendant that has been charged with a crime.146 The defendant charged with 
the crime and subsequently found guilty in the guilt phase of trial is, undeni-
ably, the same individual who then goes on to sentencing.147 This concept is 
especially true when one acknowledges that the purpose of the guilt phase of 
trial is to determine guilt and then proceed to punishment of the guilty.148
When considered in that context, it follows that the Sixth Amendment rights 
that apply at the guilt phase must also apply at the sentencing phase. Thus, 
in following the text of the Sixth Amendment, other courts should recognize 
a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights at the sentencing phase of trial.  
2. Bifurcated Trial Not Contemplated by Framers Argument 
Furthermore, courts should adopt the Vankirk reasoning because apply-
ing the Confrontation Clause at sentencing will ensure that information that 
may deprive a defendant of liberty does not go untested. As Justice Scalia 
pointed out in his dissent in Michigan v. Bryant, preventing ex parte exami-
nations at trial is what the Framers intended when the Confrontation Clause 
was included in the Constitution.149 Many courts have erroneously claimed 
 141. See U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
 142. G. Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and Melendez-
Diaz), 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 41 (2009) (referring to then-Judge Sotomayor’s opinion in 
U.S. v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 143. See Douglass, supra note 142, at 1970.  
 144. Id. (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)). 
 145. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 146. Fenner, supra note 144, at 42.  
 147. Id. at 42–43. “At sentencing the person has not changed and we cannot ignore the 
fact that sentencing generally is a vital part of the criminal prosecution.” Id.
 148. Douglass, supra note 142, at 2008.  
 149. 131 S. Ct. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “Preventing the admission of ‘weaker 
substitute[s] for live testimony at trial’ such as this is precisely what motivated the Framers to 
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that the sentencing phase of trial is not what the Framers thought of as part 
of a criminal prosecution.150 However, history shows that trials in the past 
were not divided into two separate phases and thus could not have been con-
templated as such by the Framers when constructing the Confrontation 
Clause.151 Instead, when this country was founded, the trial process and the 
sentencing process were one in the same.152 As Judge Arnold noted, both the 
text and the context are important when interpreting the Sixth Amendment, 
and he recognized that “the Framers of the Bill of Rights knew nothing of 
sentencing proceedings separate from the trial itself. Most sentences fol-
lowed automatically from conviction. In general, the punishment for felony 
was death.”153 This method of utilizing only one proceeding for the guilt and 
sentencing of a criminal defendant continued until the nineteenth century.154
Thus, the Framers only knew of a trial comprised of both parts and fash-
ioned the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment with that under-
standing in mind.155 Therefore, both the history surrounding the birth of the 
Confrontation Clause and the purpose that the Framers intended the clause 
to serve support the Vankirk holding.  
3. Avoiding the “Principal Evil” Argument 
Another reason state and federal courts should follow the Vankirk deci-
sion is that applying the Confrontation Clause at sentencing protects crimi-
nal defendants from evidence that has not been subjected to the adversarial 
tests. In Crawford, the Court stated that “the principal evil at which the Con-
frontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal proce-
dure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against 
adopt the Confrontation Clause and what motivated our decisions in Crawford and in 
Hammon v. Indiana, decided with Davis.” Id. (internal citation omitted).  
 150. See supra Part A.2. 
 151. Douglass, supra note 142, at 1967. Although this author focuses on capital sentenc-
ing, many of the arguments apply at non-capital sentencing as well. 
 152. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at 
Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 51 (2011).  
 153. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). As Professor John Douglass phrased it, “The Framers knew nothing 
of a ‘guilt’ phase and a ‘penalty’ phase. They crafted the Sixth Amendment not only to pro-
tect the innocent from punishment, but also to protect the guilty from undeserved death.” 
Douglass, supra note 142, at 1967. Instead, both guilt and sentencing, which was death if 
found guilty, happened in only one proceeding and was based on only one verdict. Id. at 
1972. 
 154. White, supra note 141, at 397–98. 
 155. Id. at 398. “It was on this slate—with joined guilt and sentencing phases—that the 
Framers chose the words ‘in all criminal prosecutions.’” Id.
2013] BRAVING CONFRONTATION 707
the accused.”156 This “principal evil” can only be fully prevented if the con-
stitutional safeguards that the Framers adopted apply throughout the crimi-
nal prosecution—including sentencing.  
For example, if the prosecution is allowed to present evidence at sen-
tencing that was obtained outside of trial, the possibility of abuse is in-
creased,157 and the evidence could be considered an ex parte examination.158
This type of evidence is contrary to the very purpose of the Sixth Amend-
ment, which is focused on seeking the truth and protecting the rights of the 
accused.159 As scholars have noted, “[c]onstitutional rights are designed to 
limit the state’s ability to deprive individuals of their liberty. Sentencing is 
the process through which the state deprives those convicted of crimes of 
their liberty. Thus, the recognition of constitutional rights at sentencing is 
paramount.”160 Additionally, the Confrontation Clause “provides assurance 
that prosecution witnesses will give their testimony in the way demanded for 
centuries by Anglo-American courts—in the presence of the accused, sub-
ject to cross-examination—rather than any other way.”161
Consider, for example, United States v. Wise,162 where the defendant 
pled guilty to the charges against him and was sentenced using the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.163 During the sentencing phase, the probation officer 
was allowed to testify regarding factual matters included in the presentence 
report.164 His testimony, however, also contained allegations from other 
criminal defendants claiming Wise was the organizer of the counterfeiting 
scheme.165 Individuals outside of the courtroom provided the information 
that the officer testified to, and, though the officer had never even met those 
 156. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). The Court went on to state that, 
when interpreting the Sixth Amendment, the principal evil has to be kept in mind in order to 
avoid it. Id. 
 157. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A 
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 561 (1992). Additional-
ly, the witness’s testimony can be shaped to fit the theory that the prosecution has for the case 
and may not be as close to the truth as it would be if tested during cross-examination. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47–66 (discussing what evidence is considered ex
parte). 
 159. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 643 
(1996). 
 160. Hessick, supra note 155, at 49. The article goes on to state that because many crimi-
nal defendants plead guilty as opposed to going to trial, sentencing is now “a critically im-
portant phase of the criminal justice system.” Id. at 56. 
 161. Richard D. Friedman, Who Said the Crawford Revolution Would be Easy?, 26 CRIM.
JUST. 14 (2012). 
 162. 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992). This case was decided prior to the current Supreme 
Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
 163. Id. at 396. 
 164. Id. at 395–96. 
 165. Id. Because the probation officer was testifying at sentencing, the hearsay statements 
were allowed. Id. 
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individuals, that information was used to increase Wise’s sentence by twelve 
months through a four-level enhancement.166 Although one additional year 
in jail may not seem too extreme, it becomes a very serious matter when one 
considers that the information used to justify the extra time had not been 
tested for its truthfulness and, in fact, was possibly a complete lie. For an 
even more egregious example, consider Williams v. New York, where the 
defendant was sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment, but the judge used 
untested information167 to increase his sentence to death.168 For these rea-
sons, to ensure that only tested information is used in determining the sen-
tence that a criminal defendant receives, other courts should follow the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court’s lead in Vankirk and rule that the Confrontation 
Clause must apply at sentencing. 
4. Wrong Precedent Argument 
Additionally, other courts should hold, as the Arkansas Supreme Court 
did, that Williams v. New York169 is not Supreme Court precedent for deny-
ing the Confrontation Clause’s application at sentencing.170 For years, courts 
throughout the country have relied on Williams as precedent because the 
Supreme Court has not decided a case since then that comes as close to an 
analysis of confrontation rights at sentencing.171 As noted by the Vankirk
court, however, Williams involved a Due Process Clause analysis as op-
posed to a Confrontation Clause analysis.172 Although there are certainly due 
process concerns involved when a defendant is denied the right to confront 
witnesses, the two constitutional issues are distinct—located in two different 
amendments and providing for two different rights.173
 166. Id. at 405–06 (Arnold, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 167. Id. at 242–44. In Williams, the judge considered information contained in the pre-
sentence report, such as allegations implicating the defendant in burglaries that he had never 
been convicted of and information that the judge considered to be reflective of the defend-
ant’s “‘morbid sexuality’” and status as a “‘menace to society,’” which the defendant did not 
have an opportunity to challenge or rebut. 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949). This information was 
what swayed the judge to depart from the jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment and to 
instead sentence the defendant to death. Id.
 168. Id. at 242. 
 169. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 170. Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, 8, 385 S.W.3d 144, 150.   
 171. Though in Specht v. Patterson, the Supreme Court did find that due process required 
attachment of confrontation rights to any enhancement of a sentence during the sentencing 
phase. 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967). See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) 
(holding that any fact increasing the defendant’s penalty beyond the statutory maximum has 
to be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 172. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at 8, 385 S.W.3d at 150.
 173. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV. 
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In Williams, the Court was concerned with allowing as much infor-
mation as possible into the sentencing process because it allowed the sen-
tencing judge to provide an individualized punishment that the Court be-
lieved would lead to better offender rehabilitation and reformation.174 Since 
Williams, however, the Court has transformed its Confrontation Clause 
analysis and has recognized the importance of truthful evidence over abun-
dant evidence.175
Additionally, as attorney Benjamin McMurray remarked, “[r]ather than 
mechanically applying old cases, courts should carefully consider the vari-
ous reasons why their precedents were misguided.”176  Relying strictly on a 
case that only involves a due process challenge as a means to deny a crimi-
nal defendant’s confrontation right at sentencing is fundamentally flawed. 
This statement becomes especially true when one considers the changes that 
the Supreme Court has made in the last decade alone regarding its Confron-
tation Clause jurisprudence.177 Consequently, the Williams decision, essen-
tially holding “the more, the better” in regard to evidence, does not hold up 
in today’s jurisprudence and, as well noted by the Vankirk court, should not 
be used as Supreme Court precedent to deny confrontation rights at sentenc-
ing. 
5. Fairness Argument 
Finally, courts should adopt the Vankirk decision because allowing a 
defendant his confrontation rights at sentencing ensures that the entire trial 
is fair, from start to finish. If the Confrontation Clause is not applied at sen-
 174. Williams, 337 U.S. at 248. 
 175. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (holding that blood-alcohol 
analysis reports were testimonial and that the defendant had a right to confront the certifying 
analyst); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (holding that a victim’s statements dur-
ing a 911 call were not testimonial as they were to aid police in an ongoing emergency, but a 
domestic battery victim’s statements to police in an affidavit were testimonial because there 
was no emergency in progress); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that a 
trial court’s upward enhancement to the statutory sentence range based on a judicial determi-
nation made after the plea violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights); Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that out-of-court statements by witnesses, if testimonial, 
will not be admitted unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine, regardless of the statement’s reliability); see also White, supra 
note 139, at 421–424 (analyzing the effects of recent Supreme Court Confrontation Clause 
decisions on capital sentencings). 
 176. Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested Facts at Sentencing: The Applicabil-
ity of Crawford at Sentencing after Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 589, 625 (2006). This 
article also provides a chronological look at how sentencing has changed throughout the 
years, including adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 591–605. 
 177. See White, supra note 139, at 406–07 (2006). The article also notes changes made 
regarding other individual rights since the Williams decision. Id. 
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tencing, the fairness of the trial is in question, the integrity of the justice 
system is weakened, and the travesty of Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial vividly 
comes back to mind.178
The Supreme Court has recognized fairness during the trial process as 
one of the Framers’ central concerns when drafting the Bill of Rights.179 For 
fairness to exist throughout trial, the defendant must be able to confront the 
witnesses against him at sentencing and must be able to test the facts assert-
ed at sentencing to decide his fate. In rejecting the reliability standard previ-
ously followed, the Crawford Court noted that “[d]ispensing with confronta-
tion because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury 
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth 
Amendment prescribes.”180
Allowing the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause at sentencing 
serves the fairness purpose in two important ways. First, it is a means of 
testing the credibility and reliability of the declarant’s testimony.181 Second, 
it also serves as a check on the government’s power to create evidence re-
gardless of reliability.182 Without applying the Confrontation Clause or re-
quiring cross-examination at sentencing, witnesses could testify about any 
number of things, such as atrocities that the criminal defendant allegedly 
committed, without corroboration of the charges. This is a very dangerous 
proposition, and one that must be guarded against. Courts that subject evi-
dence to cross-examination also help avoid prosecutorial misconduct and 
help ensure that only evidence that has undergone the truth-seeking process 
is what is ultimately used to determine the sentence a criminal defendant 
receives.183 As the Crawford Court remarked, the Confrontation Clause’s 
 178. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44–45 (2004).  See also W. Jeremy 
Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington: 
Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2005) (recounting the trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh). Sir Walter Raleigh was sentenced to death because of a letter that was read 
aloud to the jury that accused him of treason. His sentencing occurred without him ever being 
given an opportunity to question the writer who accused him of the crime. Id.
 179. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). Speaking of the right of confrontation, 
the Court stated that “[t]he fact that this right appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of 
Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of those liberties and safeguards that confrontation 
was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.” Id.
 180. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
 181. See Counseller & Rickett, supra note 178, at 8. 
 182. Id. See also Berger, supra note 159, at 561. The author states that the Bill of Rights 
was created to check the government’s power, and that the Confrontation Clause prevents the 
government from being able to present evidence that was shaped to fit its case, which would 
make it more susceptible to abuse. Id. 
 183. See Daniel Shaviro, The Supreme Court’s Bifurcated Interpretation of the Confron-
tation Clause, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383, 383 (1990). 
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goal was to ensure the reliability of evidence by assessing it through the 
process of cross-examination.184
One of the ways that cross-examination helps ensure reliability is by al-
lowing the defendant to be present and question the witness. Studies have 
shown that people express themselves differently, through both facial ex-
pressions and body language, when they are face-to-face with one another.185
It is generally harder for one to lie to a person’s face than it is to lie in their 
absence.186 This characteristic has a scientific basis, as strong emotions have 
been shown to often produce “tells,” which are not likely to be present ab-
sent a face-to-face interaction.187 Consequently, less interaction will produce 
fewer “tells” that a declarant is lying, especially when the declarant is not 
being put to the scrutiny of the defendant.188
The defendant’s scrutiny of the witness in order to determine the wit-
ness’s truthfulness is one of the core principles of the Confrontation Clause 
and is one that courts, unfortunately, have not recognized at sentencing. By 
not allowing cross-examination as a check on testimony, a witness may 
make accusations that are entirely false but that are used to determine the 
sentence imposed. Therefore, other courts should follow the Arkansas Su-
preme Court’s reasoning and hold that the Confrontation Clause must apply 
at sentencing in order to test the witness’s testimony. By doing so, courts 
will be holding true to the fairness principles that the Framers intended the 
Clause to provide and will be ensuring that only accurate and tested infor-
mation is used to punish a defendant. As Judge Arnold stated, “The right of 
confrontation is worth the cost. It is, after all, not a ‘technicality’ serving 
some extraneous purpose . . . . It bears directly on and significantly advances 
the truth-seeking function of sentencing hearings. Confrontation is required 
by due process.”189
 184. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. “To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure relia-
bility of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not 
that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in 
the crucible of cross-examination.” Id.
 185. See Jery Payne, Sometimes, You Just Have to be There, 40 COLO. LAW. 107, 109 
(2011). The article is premised on the idea that even video testimony will produce less truth-
ful witnesses than if the witnesses were actually face-to-face with the defendant. Id. at 111. 
 186. See id. at 109. 
 187. See id.
 188. See id. at 110–11. “Less interaction means fewer tells. Distance beclouds guile.” Id.   
 189. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 412 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
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IV. CONCLUSION
Persons accused of crimes have important rights enumerated in the 
Constitution intended to protect them before and during trial.190 The right to 
confront witnesses has long been one of the most essential rights of criminal 
defendants. Most courts, though, have denied defendants that right during 
the sentencing phase of trial. The courts do this because the Supreme Court 
has yet to hold that the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing, and 
states are unwilling to do so without prior guidance from the Court. 
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court recently took that gallant step 
and held that the Confrontation Clause does apply at sentencing. After a 
well-reasoned analysis, the court found that the right to confront witnesses 
logically followed other Sixth Amendment rights already allowed at sen-
tencing, such as the right to counsel and the right to a speedy sentencing. By 
boldly recognizing that criminal defendants have rights, even if they have 
been found guilty of crimes, the Arkansas Supreme Court did something 
that very few courts have done. Yet, the court’s monumental decision was 
not unfounded; it is supported by the text of the Sixth Amendment, by the 
nature of the sentencing proceeding, and by the very notion of fairness and 
justice. It was also an important step in protecting individual rights provided 
by the Constitution. Therefore, the court’s extension of a criminal defend-
ant's confrontation rights at sentencing, keeping in line with the intent of the 
Framers when they conceived the Bill of Rights, is a role model for state and 
federal courts across the country.  
Cassandra Howell ∗
 190. See Heller, supra note 141, at Preface. 
∗ J.D. expected May 2013, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen 
School of Law, B.A. in English, University of Central Arkansas, 2006.  The author would 
like to thank Professor Lyn Entrikin for her guidance not only during the writing of this note 
but throughout law school; Lee Short for all of his insight; the UALR Law Review for the 
hours spent editing and fixing my mistakes; Notes Editors Ashley Haskins and Drew Bacon 
and Associate Notes Editor Larry Watkins for their patience and endless hours of work help-
ing me make sense of my argument; my family and friends for their love, support, and under-
standing; and especially my husband, Nathan, whose love, encouragement, sacrifices, and 
humor have truly blessed me beyond measure. 
